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PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
In 2017, Jamal Haynes pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to 
distribute cocaine in two separate cases. He is serving concurrent sentences of 135 
months’ and 78 months’ imprisonment. Last year, Haynes moved for sentence 
modification in both cases under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The District Court held that 
Haynes had demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting modification 
but denied relief after weighing the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We will affirm. 
I1 
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) authorizes sentence modifications in two circumstances. 
First, when “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Second, “when certain defendants reach 70 years of age, have served 
at least 30 years of their term, and have been determined not to pose a threat to society.” 
United States v. Easter, 975 F.3d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)). In either circumstance, the defendant must “fully exhaust[] all 
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding 
precedent. 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction to consider Haynes’s motion for sentence 
modification under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to 





administrative rights” before the Bureau of Prisons prior to requesting modification from 
the District Court. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 
If the District Court finds that the defendant is eligible for a sentence modification, 
it must then consider the factors listed in § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The 
§ 3553(a) factors include, among other things, (1) “the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” (2) “the need for the 
sentence imposed” to reflect the various justifications underlying the criminal justice 
system, (3) “the kinds of sentences available,” and (4) “the need to avoid unwarranted 
sentence disparities.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(3), (6). 
The District Court held that Haynes had exhausted his administrative remedies and 
had presented “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant[ing] such a reduction.” 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The government does not contest those holdings. Our review 
is thus limited to the District Court’s application of the § 3553(a) factors, which we 
review for abuse of discretion. See Easter, 975 F.3d at 322. We write primarily for the 
parties and presume their familiarity with the facts. 
II 
Haynes first argues that the District Court erred by mixing up the order of 
analysis. According to Haynes, § 3582(c)(1)(A) requires the court to consider the 
§ 3553(a) factors first, and then consider whether extraordinary and compelling reasons 
warrant modification. He suggests that the District Court’s finding of extraordinary and 
compelling reasons means that it necessarily found that the factors weigh in favor of 





says is step two means that step one must also weigh in his favor. Haynes misreads the 
statute. Section 3582(c)(1)(A) permits the court to grant relief “after considering the 
factors set forth in section 3553(a) . . . if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling 
reasons warrant such a reduction.” The conditional statement is clear: The court first 
determines whether a defendant is eligible for relief by considering whether 
“extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant” relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). If 
the court finds such reasons, it then considers the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether 
to grant the relief. Id. The text and our precedent foreclose Haynes’s attempt to flip the 
order of analysis. See Easter, 975 F.3d at 323–24; United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 
327, 329–30 (3d Cir. 2020). Haynes repeatedly emphasizes that the District Court found 
extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting sentence reduction, but that issue is not 
before this Court. After the court made that finding, it moved on to evaluate the 
§ 3553(a) factors, as the statute requires. 
Haynes also points to two cases in which district courts granted sentence 
modifications in light of COVID-19 and argues that those cases mandate the same result 
here. In United States v. Hendry, the defendant was released after serving 28.2% of his 
sentence for conspiracy to harbor aliens. No. 2:19-cr-14035, 2020 WL 4015487 (S.D. 
Fla. July 16, 2020). In United States v. Smith, the defendant was released after serving 
10% of his sentence for wire fraud. No. CR19-107RSL, 2020 WL 4345327 (W.D. Wash. 
July 29, 2020). When the District Court considered Haynes’s motion, Haynes had served 
about 30% of his sentence. The court weighed Haynes’s remaining sentence against the 





promote respect for the law and afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct weigh 
heavily against a reduction in sentence.” J.A. 11–12. The court considered deterrence of 
drug trafficking in particular, which was not an issue in Hendry or Smith. Moreover, any 
similarity to Hendry and Smith is overshadowed by the similarities between Haynes and 
his codefendants. The District Court found that reducing Haynes’s sentence by 70% 
would cause disparities between Haynes and his codefendants convicted of similar 
crimes. That was not an abuse of discretion. 
Haynes also argues that the District Court erred in concluding that he may pose a 
danger to the community if released early. Haynes cites Pepper v. United States, 562 
U.S. 476 (2011), for its holding that “a district court at resentencing may consider 
evidence of the defendant’s postsentencing rehabilitation and that such evidence may, in 
appropriate cases, support a downward variance from the now-advisory Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines range.” Id. at 481. Even assuming that Pepper applies to a motion 
to reduce a sentence, the District Court did consider Haynes’s evidence of rehabilitation 
as part of the § 3553(a) analysis. The court weighed the rehabilitation evidence against 
the severity of Haynes’s crimes and held that the factor weighed neutrally. The court did 
not abuse its discretion in concluding that the evidence of rehabilitation did not outweigh 
the severity of Haynes’s involvement in two separate large-scale drug-trafficking 
conspiracies. We have considered Haynes’s remaining arguments and find in them no 
basis for reversal. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Haynes’s 





* * * 
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
